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Dear Doctor Letters: Lessons in Statutory
Interpretation, Preemption, Proximate Causation,
and Subsequent-Remedial Measures
James W. Huston,*
Ellen Nudelman Adler** & Joanna L. Simon***
I. INTRODUCTION
Dear Doctor letters (also referred to as Dear Healthcare Provider or
"DHCP" letters) are an important avenue of communication between
pharmaceutical manufacturers and the professionals who prescribe and
administer drugs. The letters were developed as a tool for manufacturers to
effectively provide healthcare professionals with key information about a
drug. But how are Dear Doctor letters used by drug manufacturers in
practice-to properly relay new black box warnings, or to (improperly)
advertise new drug uses? Where do Dear Doctor letters fit into the FDA's
regulatory scheme-and is FDA approval required before sending out such
letters (we say yes)? What impact might a Dear Doctor letter have on
litigation? Could it be seen as an admission that the drug label was
inadequate?
This article first discusses the applicable FDA regulations and guidance
material, including the standards for when, how, and to whom Dear Doctor
letters should be issued. Next, the article reviews the extent to which
federal preemption principles apply to Dear Doctor letters as outlined by the
Supreme Court in the landmark generic case Pliva v. Mensing. The article
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then analyzes the role of Dear Doctor letters in litigation in a post-Mensing
world, including whether Dear Doctor letters can be used to show causation
and whether Dear Doctor letters are admissible evidence at trial. The article
concludes with practical tips related to sending out Dear Doctor letters.
II. FDA REGULATIONS AND GUIDANCE REGARDING

DEAR DOCTOR LETTERS
A 21 C.F.R. § 200.5
21 C.F.R. § 200.5 is the only Dear Doctor letter regulation, and has been
on the books since 1975.' Despite a myriad of changes in FDA regulations
over nearly four decades, 21 C.F.R. § 200.5 has not had a single revision
since 1975. The regulation is short, straightforward, and very specific
about things such as typeface and font size, but it poses many ambiguities
for pharmaceutical manufacturers and distributors. In full, the regulation
provides:

§ 200.5 Mailing of important information about drugs.
Manufacturers and distributors of drugs and the Food and Drug
Administration occasionally are required to mail important information
about drugs to physicians and others responsible for patient care. In the
public interest, such mail should be distinctive in appearance so that it
will be promptly recognized and read.
The Food and Drug
Administration will make such mailings in accordance with the
specifications set forth in this section. Manufacturers and distributors of
drugs are asked to make such mailings as prescribed by this section and
not to use the distinctive envelopes for ordinary mail.
(a) Use first class mail and No. 10 white envelopes.
(b) The name and address of the agency or the drug manufacturer or
distributor is to appear in the upper left corner of the envelope.
(c) The following statements are to appear in the far left third of the
envelope front, in the type and size indicated, centered in a rectangular
space approximately 3 inches wide and 2 1/4 inches high with an
approximately 3/8 inch-wide border in the color indicated:
(1) When the information concerns a significant hazard to health, the
statement:
IMPORTANT
1.

See Reorganization and Republication, 40 Fed. Reg. 13996 (Mar. 27, 1975).
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DRUG
WARNING
The statement shall be in three lines, all capitals, and centered.
"Important" shall be in 36 point Gothic Bold type. "Drug" and
"Warning" shall be in 36 point Gothic Condensed type. The rectangle's
bo
rder and the statement therein shall be red.
(2) When the information concerns important changes in drug package
labeling, the statement:
IMPORTANT
PRESCRIBING
INFORMATION
The statement shall be in three lines, all capitals, and centered.
"Important" shall be in 36 point Gothic Bold type. "Prescribing" and
"Information" shall be in 36 point Gothic Condensed type. The
rectangle's border and the statement therein shall be blue.
(3) When the information concerns a correction of prescription drug
advertising or labeling, the statement:
IMPORTANT
CORRECTION
OF DRUG
INFORMATION
The statement shall be in four lines, all capitals, and centered.
"Important" shall be in 36 point Gothic Bold type. "Correction," "Of
Drug," and "Information" shall be in 36 point Gothic Condensed type.
The rectangle's border and the statement therein shall be brown.
1. "Important" Information Standard
Repeated throughout 21 C.F.R. § 200.5 is the "important information"
standard, cautioning manufacturers and distributors not to waste the time of
physicians and other health care professionals with trivial information and
updates . But what constitutes "important" information? According to the
regulation, Dear Doctor letters are meant to convey "important information
about drugs to physicians," including information concerning "a significant
hazard to health," "important changes in drug package labeling," or "a
correction of prescription drug advertising or labeling ."
While the

2.
3.
4.

Mailing of Important Information about Drugs, 21 C.F.R. § 200.5 (2013).
Id.
21 C.F.R. § 200.5 (emphasis added).
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regulation sheds some light on what kind of information may be the subject
of a Dear Doctor letter, it leaves much room to determine when that
information is "important" or "significant" enough to send out in a mailer.'
a. FDA Request for Dear Doctor Letter
The easiest case to meet the "important information" criterion is when
the FDA requests a manufacturer or distributor to send out a Dear Doctor
letter by a certain date. Indeed, if the letter is expected to be sent out, and it
is not sent soon enough (or not sent at all), the FDA may elect to take action
by issuing a press release or public health advisory.6 In our experience, in
nearly all cases it is better for the manufacturer or distributor to craft the
Dear Doctor letter rather than to leave it to the FDA to alert healthcare
professionals.
b. Important New Information
One common sense, well-recognized condition for whether information
is important is whether it is "new." 7 The idea is that if the information has
been adequately publicized in the medical literature, there is no need to
"alert" healthcare professionals to what they should already know through
their required, continuing medical education.
In addition to highlighting that the information should be new, the FDA
has provided draft guidance on what should be included in each of the three
categories of Dear Doctor letters: (1) Important Drug Warning, (2)
Important Prescribing Information, and (3) Important Correction of Drug
Information."
c. Important Drug Warning
The FDA suggests that an "Important Drug Warning" letter "should be
used to convey important new safety information that 'concerns a

5. Courts have not clarified the meaning of "important information"-rather, they have
shown a penchant for simply parroting the words of the regulation. Weiss v. Fujisawa
Pharm. Co., 464 F. Supp. 2d 666, 675 (E.D. Ky. 2006) ("the regulations encourage drug
manufacturers to periodically send important information ... to health care providers")
(emphasis added).
6.
See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CTR. DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, NDAs: "DEAR
HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONAL" LETTERS 4 (2003), available at http://www.fda.gov/

downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDER/ManualofPoliciesProcedures/ucm082012.pdf.
7.
See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FDA STAFF: DEAR HEALTH
CARE PROVIDER LETTERS: IMPROVING COMMUNICATION OF IMPORTANT SAFETY INFORMATION

2 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 Guidance for Industry], available at http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/Dmgs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/Guidances/UCM233769.pdf.
8. 21 C.F.R. § 200.5.
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significant hazard to health' (21 C.F.R. § 200.5) and, therefore, could affect
the decision to use a drug or require a change in behavior concerning use of
the drug (e.g., a specific type of monitoring)." 9 More specifically, this type
of Dear Doctor letter "should be used for information that is to be
incorporated into one or more of the following labeling sections: BOXED
WARNINGS,
CONTRAINDICATIONS,
or WARNINGS
AND
0
PRECAUTIONS."
The following are examples of "Important Drug
Warnings":
*

Previously unknown serious or life-threatening adverse reactions

*

Clinically important new infonnation about a known adverse
reaction

*

Identification of a subpopulation at greater risk in whom the

drug should be used with added caution (e.g. patients with renal
or hepatic failure, HIV+ patients)
*

Identification of a subpopulation in whom the drug is

contraindicated
*

Drug interaction or medication error that may result in a serious
or life-threatening adverse reaction"

Some recent exemplar Dear Doctor letters falling under the category of
"Important Drug Warning" are a January 2012 letter concerning potential
side effects of type-2 diabetes drug Bydureon,12 and an August 2012 letter
issued concurrently with a "Black Box" warning 3 for the anti-malaria drug,
9. 2010 Guidance for Industry, supra note 7, at 3.
10.
Id.
11.
Id.
12.
Letter from Lisa Porter, Vice President, Amylin Pharmaceuticals, Inc., to
Healthcare Professionals (Jan. 2012), available at http://www.pdr.net/drugpages/product
safetyalert.aspx?ha= 1000137.
The Bydureon letter warned of two potential risks associated with Bydureon: Medullary
Thyroid Carcinoma ("MTC") and Acute Pancreatitis. The letter also provided information
on how to assess patients for these risks and how to avoid prescribing Bydureon to at-risk
patients, including a specific recommendation for "[rioutine monitoring of serum calcitonin
or using of a thyroid ultrasound if MTC is suspected."
13.
A "Black Box" label reflects the most serious warning that can be given about any
particular drug, and indicates that medical studies have shown the drug carries a significant
risk of serious or even life-threatening adverse effects. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:

WARNINGS

AND PRECAUTIONS

(Oct. 2011), available

at

http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/Guidanc
es/ucm075096.pdf. Manufacturers may be forced by the FDA to implement black box
warnings on particular drugs. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.520 and 601.42 ("Approval with
restrictions to assure safe use").
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Qualaquin.14
As discussed below, Dear Doctor letters are considered part of a drug's
labeling, 5 and the FDA's guidance makes clear that if the important drug
information is not "important" enough to wind up in the package insert, it
probably should not be the subject of a Dear Doctor letter.
d. Important Prescribing Information
"Important Prescribing Information" letters "should be used to convey
important changes to prescribing information other than those changes that
should be described in an Important Drug Warning Letter[.]"' 6 The letter
"should ordinarily be used to convey substantive changes to the
INDICATIONS AND USAGE and DOSAGE AND ADMINISTRATION
sections."' The FDA provides the following examples:
*

A change in the INDICATIONS section intended to minimize
risk or improve effectiveness

*

A change to the dose or dosage regimen intended to minimize
risk or improve effectiveness8

Again, this is the kind of information that would make a drug
manufacturer or distributor believe that a change in the label was in order.
Of note, the FDA cautions that such an "Important Prescribing Information"
letter "should not be used merely to announce a new indication." 9 In other
words, this is not a letter to advertise new uses for the drug, but rather to
reduce the risk and increase the effectiveness for previously indicated uses.
Some sample Dear Doctor letters falling under the category of
"Important Prescribing Information" are a November 2011 Dear Doctor
letter advising that the FDA had revoked its approval of Avastin for the
treatment of metastatic breast cancer, 2 0 and a June 2011 letter with new

14.
Letter from Matthew Davis, Senior Vice President, AR Scientific, Inc., to
Healthcare Provider (Aug. 16, 2012), available at http://www.pdr.net/drugpages/product
safetyalert.aspx?ha=1000138. The Dear Doctor letter contained the text of the Black Box
warning, which advised that "[t]he risk associated with Qualaquin use in the absence of
evidence of its effectiveness in the treatment or prevention of nocturnal leg cramps
outweighs any potential benefit" and identified thrombocytopenia and chronic renal
impairment as possible adverse effects of the off-label use.
15.
See infra Section II(B).
16.
See 2010 Guidance for Industry, supra note 7, at 3.
17.
Id.
18.
Id. at 3-4.
19.
Id. at 4.
20. Letter from Hal Barron, Chief Medical Officer, Genetech, to Healthcare Professional
(Nov. 18, 2011) available at http://www.pdr.net/drugpages/hapdf/1176-11%/o20PDRAlrt%/o20
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dosage and administration instructions for the chronic kidney disease drugs,
Aranesp and Epogen/Procrit.21
e. Important Correction of Drug Information Letter
The third category, the "Important Correction of Drug Information"
letter, should be used "to correct false or misleading information or other
misinformation in prescription drug promotional labeling and advertising
that is the subject of a Warning Letter or other Agency action."22 In our
experience, this kind of letter is the least likely to be initiated by the
manufacturer or distributor, with the hopes that the FDA or consumer
groups may not find the information to be misleading. However, once the
manufacturer or distributor realizes that there is materially false or
misleading information in its label or advertising, we have found that the
best avenue to remedy the issue is to take control of how to frame it, rather
than wait for the FDA to issue a warning letter about the alleged
misinformation.
One example of an "Important Correction of Drug Information" letter is
a November 2011 letter concerning the correction of "false and misleading
promotion" of FerahemeR following an FDA warning letter.23 The letter
explained that the manufacturer's website previously "misleadingly
suggested" that the drug was proven safe and effective for certain uses,
when in fact it was not. 2 4 The letter clarified that the drug "is only indicated
for the treatment of iron deficiency anemia in adult patients with chronic
kidney disease."25

Avastino20LTRI%20and.. .pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2013). Reflecting the importance of
the new information, the letter is dated the same day as the FDA's announcement, before a
revised prescribing label was available for circulation.
21.
The letter was available at http://www.aranesp.contpdf/aranespdhcpletterjune2011 .pdf (last visited September 30, 2012). It is no longer available at the online at link
or from aranesp.com. The new prescribing information was based on the results from three
randomized, controlled trials in which certain patients experienced greater risks for death,
serious adverse cardiovascular reactions, and stroke. Among other things, the letter advised
of different dosing requirements for patients on or off of dialysis.
22.
2010 Guidance for Industry, supra note 7, at 4.
23.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., WARNING LETTER TO DR. BRIAN J.G. PEREIRA, MD,
PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, AMAG PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. (Oct. 18, 2010),
available at http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylInformation/Enforce
mentActivitiesbyFDA/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharmaceuticalCompan
ies/ucm259186.htm.
Id.
24.
Id.
25.
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f. "ImportantInformation" Or ImproperAdvertising?
Even with the FDA's guidance on what constitutes "important
information," there is still room for disagreement on what is "important."
When it comes to positive product information, manufacturers sometimes
use the imprecise "important information" standard to justify mailers sent
principally for advertising purposes. Manufacturers have used the mailer to
"alert" doctors about the advent of a new packaging size, a new indication,
or a new and improved formula.
For example, a 2012 Dear Doctor letter announced "the availability" of a
particular drug. The letter notified healthcare professionals that the drug
was "available at most pharmacies, including chain pharmacies." While we
are not privy to the full background of the drug in question and its
availability prior to June 2012, the Dear Doctor letter certainly appears to
be more like advertising than a vehicle to convey "important drug
information."
Promotional Dear Doctor letters of that sort are tempting to send from
the manufacturer's standpoint. What else would a doctor more likely read
than a letter that crosses his or her desk with the title "IMPORTANT
DRUG INFORMATION"? 26 At a minimum, doctors are more likely to
carefully read Dear Doctor letters than a "paid" advertisement in a medical
or science journal. However, if reviewed by the FDA, these types of Dear
Doctor letters may be frowned upon as including insufficiently "important"
information and crossing the line into improper advertising. (In our
experience, however, such letters have not drawn a warning letter from the
FDA.)
Unfortunately, marketing-based Dear Doctor letters dilute the
effectiveness of legitimate Dear Doctor letters. If a doctor's mailbox is full
of advertisements and "important" new drug information in the same format
as a formal Dear Doctor letter, the doctor will be less likely to sift through
all the letters and give due consideration to the genuinely "important"
letters.
2. "Occasionally Are Required" Standard & "Encouraged"
Consultation With FDA
21 C.F.R. § 200.5 provides that drug manufacturers and distributors of

26.
Of course, not all doctors routinely review Dear Doctor letters. See, e.g., Janssen
Pharmaceutica, Inc. v. Bailey, 878 So.2d 31, 42, 58 (Miss. 2004) (one doctor "testified that
he did not make it a practice to read 'Dear Doctor' letters or updated package inserts";
"[o]ther physicians testifying for the Plaintiffs admitted that they never bothered to read the
updated labels or 'Dear Doctor' letters because their family practices kept them too busy to
keep abreast of the changes in the drugs which they were prescribing.").
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drugs "occasionally are required" to mail important information about
drugs.2 What do "occasionally" and "required" mean? The clearest
example is the "occasion" when the FDA tells the manufacturer or
distributor they are so "required"; though in our expenience, that is a very
small subset of cases. Presumably, information that is "important" and
"new" should always be sent out, not just "occasionally."
The
"occasionally" language may simply suggest that "important information"
is not a routine or daily occurrence, and should arise only on certain
occasions, so as not to barrage doctors with too many not-so-important
letters.
As for the "required" language, the regulation does not have a specific
enforcement mechanism for not sending out a Dear Doctor letter, such as a
civil or criminal fine or penalty.28 Of course, the FDA has many tools at its
disposal in addition to sending out the Dear Doctor letter itself, including
sending out the information through a different medium, such as its
MedWatch website. Moreover, because Dear Doctor letters are part of the
broader drug labeling system, 29 the FDA may find regulatory violations
based on the lack of disclosure of "important" new information in the
manufacturer's or distributer's labeling.
When in doubt about the need to send a Dear Doctor letter, the FDA
"encourages" manufacturers and distributors to contact the agency to
determine together whether such a letter is the appropriate mechanism to
convey the new information.30 The FDA also suggests it can help to
determine "[h]ow to present the new information in the letter" and "[t]he
target audience for the information in the letter."3 ' The FDA indicates that
consulting with them before distributing the letter "could potentially avoid
the need to send a corrective letter in the event that the FDA determines,
after a [Dear Doctor letter] has been sent, that the content of the letter was
somehow false or misleading,"3 2 or "lacking in fair balance."33 A corrective
27.

21 C.F.R. § 200.5

28.
21 U.S.C. §§ 331 and 333 provide penalties for the misbranding of any "food, drug,
device tobacco product or cosmetic in interstate commerce" or the sale, manufacture, or
delivery of the same. These provisions, together, do provide an enforcement mechanism for
the FDA for misbranding/mislabeling a drug. However, there is no enforcement provision
specific to violations of the Dear Doctor letter regulation. Arguably, the FDA's power to
send a Dear Doctor letter on behalf of a manufacturer, or worse yet, require a drug recall,
provide for sufficient enforcement.
29.
See infra Section 11 (B).
30. See 2010 Guidance for Industry, supra note 7, at 2.
Id.
31.
32. Id.
33.
See NDAs: "Dear Healthcare Professional" Letters, supra note 6, at 7; see also id. at
4 ("When a [Dear Doctor] letter is disseminated without FDA input and the FDA disagrees
with the letter's content, [the Division of Drug Marketing, Advertising, and Communication
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letter may be in the form of an FDA press release or public health
advisory.34 Or, the corrective action may be a request that the manufacturer
"issue an appropriately revised letter and labeling/promotional materials (as
applicable) .
3. The Sender: Manufacturer/Distributor or FDA
Once the decision has been made to send out a Dear Doctor letter, who
should mail it? 21 C.F.R. § 200.5 states that both the FDA and
manufacturer "will" send out "Dear Doctor" letters.36 As a practical matter,
however, the FDA rarely sends out such letters itself.3 7 The FDA
recognizes that "typically" they will not be the one to issue these letters.38
For example, they may choose to post the manufacturer's or distributer's
letter on its MedWatch website.
The FDA also recognizes that they will not always be consulted about a
Dear Doctor letter before it is sent out. 39 However, since the letter may end
up on the FDA's MedWatch website, and even more importantly, since the
letter is deemed part of the drug's label, 40 a manufacturer or distributor that
is seriously considering sending out a letter should consult with the FDA
for review and approval of the letter. The Eleventh Circuit has noted that
"FDA approval must be sought prior to issuing such a letter, as it is
considered a change in package labeling."'
As discussed above, the
manufacturer or distributor who decides not to inform the FDA makes that
decision at its own peril.
4. The Recipient: "Physicians And Others Responsible For Patient Care"
After the manufacturer or distributor decides that a Dear Doctor letter is
needed (or "required"), who should the letter be mailed to? 21 C.F.R. §
200.5 provides that the mailer should be sent to "physicians and others

(DDMAC)] will initiate an enforcement action that may lead to corrective actions.").
34. Id. at 7-8.
35. Id. at 8.
36. 21 C.F.R. § 200.5 ("The Food and Drug Administration will make such mailings in
accordance with the specifications set forth in this section.") (emphasis added).
37. See NDAs: "Dear Healthcare Professional" Letters, supra note 6, at 3.
38. See id.
39.
Id. at 1 ("The FDA may or may not be involved in reviewing these DHCP letters
before they are mailed."); id. at 7 ("Occasionally, FDA does not learn about a [Dear Doctor]
letter until after it has been distributed.")
40.
See infra Section 11(b).
41.
See, e.g., Christopher v. Cutter Labs., 53 F.3d 1184, 1187 n.3 (11th Cir. 1995)
(emphasis added).
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responsible for patient care."42 In the world of advanced medicine, with
physicians divided into hundreds of specialty areas, the regulation says little
about the scope of the mailer. Should the mailer be blasted to every
physician and health care professional-including pharmacists, physician's
assistants, and nurses-in the United States? 43 That would be impractical.
While the FDA provides some guidance on who the "target audience" for
a Dear Doctor letter should be, it is a wide-ranging audience: "all healthcare
providers who are likely to prescribe, dispense, or administer the drug and
others who would have a need to know the information being
disseminated."
Potential prescribers are usually the "most important
audience," so the "manufacturer should make certain to direct the letter to
the full range of healthcare providers who would have occasion to prescribe
the drug, including nurse practitioners and physician assistants who have
prescribing authority."45 Examples of other important recipients include (1)
emergency department or primary care doctors who may not prescribe the
drug, but may provide care for patients with a drug-induced adverse
reaction discussed in the letter, and (2) pharmacists who would be required
to distribute a new Medication Guide announced in the letter.
Even with the FDA's general guidance, the target audience may be
difficult to define. For example, "important" side effect information about
an arthritis drug likely should be sent not only to rheumatologists (and their
assistants and nurse practitioners) that may prescribe or administer the drug,
but also family medicine general practitioners, orthopedic specialists, and
nurses who need to be cognizant of the side effect. But if the side effect
relates to another medical specialty, such as cardiology, should the mailer
also be sent to cardiologists and cardiac surgeons too? Probably yes. And
for drugs that are prescribed by specialists to adults as well as children,
should all pediatricians be included as part of the distribution list, even
though they may not be the primary prescribers of the medication?
Probably yes, but it is a judgment call. As discussed above, direct
consultation with the FDA may help to properly define the target audience
in each individual situation.
Once the pertinent subset of physicians and healthcare providers is

42.
21 C.F.R. § 200.5.
43.
Of course, many drugs have worldwide distribution. However, the manufacturer's
and distributor's international duties are presumably not covered by 21 C.F.R. § 200.5, and
are thus not within the scope of this article.
44.
See 2010 Guidance for Industry, supra note 7, at 5. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FDA STAFF, (Nov. 2010), http://www.fda.gov/downfloads/
Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/Guidances/UCM233769.pdf.
Id.
45.
Id.
46.
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identified, there comes the not-so-simple issue of obtaining their mailing
information. Typically, this is not public information and manufacturers
and distributors must obtain (i.e., pay for) mailing lists from private
consultants, which, in our experience, can be quite pricey. Consideration
may be given to using contact lists from medical associations and specialty
organizations, such as the American Medical Association or the American
College of Cardiology. The problem, of course, is that such voluntary
membership associations do not capture the full target audience.
Needless to say, the manufacturer sending out a Dear Doctor letter does
not want to be in the position of sending out key drug information to fewer
than all of the affected healthcare professionals, subjecting itself to failureto-warn lawsuits by plaintiffs whose doctors prescribed the drug without the
benefit of the Dear Doctor letter.
5. The Mechanism: First Class Mail Or Electronic Means
After reviewing 21 C.F.R. § 200.5, the manufacturer may wonder if it
still has to use "first class mail and No. 10 white envelopes." There is a
clear answer to this question. E-mail or other electronic communications
will suffice as long as they are equally efficient tools. 47 The FDA has
additional guidelines on "Using Electronic Means to Distribute Certain
Product Information" (March 2006).8 These include:
*

The subject line of the communication should include a signal of
its importance, similar to the bold headers in mailings, together
with the name of the drug product.

*

The body of the communication should be concise, clear and
identify the consequence if the information is not followed or
used in the medical treatment of patients.

*

The communications should not be promotional or contain links
to promotional materials.49
B. Dear Doctor Letters as Label Changes

Despite the myriad ambiguities that surround when, how, and to whom
Dear Doctor letters should be sent, there is no doubt that courts and the
FDA consider Dear Doctor letters to fall under the purview of "Drug

47.

See 2010 Guidance for Industry, supra note 7, at 1 ("These recommendations are

also intended to apply to [Dear Doctor] letters distributed by electronic means (e.g., email) to
the extent practical for the type of electronic communication used.").
48.
See 2010 Guidance for Industry, supra note 7, at 6.
Id.
49.
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Labeling." 50 This further complicates the already difficult decision facing
manufacturers regarding whether to send a Dear Doctor letter, because with
every Dear Doctor letter sent, a manufacturer is effectively changing its
drug's label. And, as all manufacturers know, making or failing to make
label changes can have serious consequences if litigation ensues.When is a
label change necessary? Under FDA regulations, a label change is required
"as soon as there is reasonable evidence of an association of a serious
hazard with a drug; a causal relationship need not have been proved." 5' Of
course, obtaining FDA approval for a label change can be a timeconsuming, drawn-out, and expensive proposition. When the drug label
change is time-sensitive, a brand name drug manufacturer 52 may, on its own
accord, use the Changes Being Effected ("CBE") process to change the
label to add to or strengthen a warning or adverse event description while
concurrently submitting a supplement to obtain formal approval for that
change. 53 This permits a pharmaceutical manufacturer to rapidly distribute
a new warning while meeting the formal requirement for FDA approval of
all labeling changes. 54 The FDA may subsequently reject the change, at
which time the label must be changed back. If the FDA approves the
change, then the label can remain as is. The FDA reserves similar rights to
reject or correct label changes suggested in Dear Doctor letters that are not
approved in advance by the FDA.
III. DEAR DOCTOR LETTER CASE LAW: LESSONS IN PREEMPTION,
FAILURE TO WARN, AND POST-REMEDIAL MEASURES

The ambiguity surrounding Dear Doctor letter regulation, combined with
the fact that Dear Doctor letters constitute drug labeling, has created a
minefield for drug manufacturers and plenty of fodder for failure-to-warn
cases against them. This section will discuss the role of the Dear Doctor
50.
Drug labeling is governed by a complicated scheme of federal regulations. In
particular, Title 21, Part 200 of the Code of Federal Regulations details labeling
requirements. Under the Regulations, "Dear Doctor" letters are considered part of a drug's
label. 21 C.F.R. § 321(m); U.S. v. Guardian Chem. Corp., 410 F.2d 157, 160-61 (2nd Cir.
1969) ("In order to 'accompany' an article and thus constitute 'labeling' for it, printed
pamphlets or brochures need not be shipped along with the article; they may be sent out
either before or after the article and still 'accompany it."').
51.
21 C.F.R § 201.80(e) (2012); 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(e) (2005).
52.
This option is not available to generic drug manufacturers. See Pliva v. Mensing,
131 S. Ct. 2567, 2576 (2011).
53.
See 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6) (2012).
54.
In fact, the FDA's briefing in the Mensing case suggested that the CBE process is
the only permissible means for adding to or strengthening a warning. See Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing, Nos. 09993, 09-1039, WL 4339894, at *6-7 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2010).
55. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6) (2012).
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letter in litigation. When a Dear Doctor letter was not sent, plaintiffs fold
this into their failure-to-wam claim, arguing that had their doctor only
received such a letter, their injuries would have been avoided. This Dear
Doctor letter argument presents interesting issues of proximate causation on
summary judgment motions. And when a Dear Doctor letter has been sent
after the alleged injury, plaintiffs have tried to admit the letter as evidence
of the drug label's inadequacy at the time the drug was prescribed. This
Dear Doctor letter argument raises admissibility issues for subsequent
remedial measures.
But first, we discuss the role that Dear Doctor letters have played in
federal preemption cases laying out the warning duties of generic and brand
name manufacturers.
A Preemption and Dear Doctor Letters, Pre- and Post-Mensing
1. Pre-Mensing: Using "Dear Doctor" Letters to Fight
Preemption Defense by Generic and Brand Name Manufacturers
For years, plaintiffs successfully argued that federal law did not preempt
failure-to-wam claims, in part because of the ability of manufacturers to
send out Dear Doctor letters. 6 In Perry v. Novartis Pharma. Corp., for
example, the court noted that a plaintiff could maintain an action against a
brand-name manufacturer if the plaintiff "claimed that a manufacturer was
negligent in not sending a letter to prescribing physicians or other
healthcare professionals[1.]" 57
Similarly, in Weiss v. Fujisawa
Pharmaceutical Co., the court found "the regulations encourage [brand
name] drug manufacturers to periodically send important information,
including information regarding risks, to healthcare providers. Therefore,
there are a number of ways a drug company can warn users of its product's

risks[.]"
Even in cases involving generic drugs, courts routinely found that
manufacturers could "ask the FDA to send 'Dear Doctor' warning letters to
healthcare professionals," thus precluding a finding of preemption.59 Just as
56.
See, e.g., Weiss v. Fujisawa Pharm. Co., 464 F. Supp. 2d 666 (E.D. Ky. 2006),
Perry v. Novartis Pharma. Corp., 456 F. Supp. 2d 678 (E.D. Pa. 2006); Gaeta v. Perrigo
Pharms. Co., 630 F.3d 1225, 1231 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593
F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 2010); Vitatoe v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 696 F.Supp. 2d 599 (N.D.W. Va.
2010); Schedin v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharms., Inc., 776 F. Supp. 2d 907, 911 (D. Minn.
2011) ("Ortho-McNeil still had various other options at its disposal to warn consumers, such
as 'Dear Doctor' letters, or training by sales representatives with individual doctors. It could
also have proposed an alteration to the label.").
57. Perry, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 686.
58. Weiss, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 675.
59.
Gaeta, 630 F.3d. at 1235 (9th Cir. 2011) ("Perrigo could have suggested that the
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these Dear Doctor letter preemption arguments seemed to be gaining
traction, the Supreme Court reversed course in the landmark generic
preemption case, Pliva v. Mensing.60
2. Post-Mensing: Generic Manufacturers Cannot
Independently Transmit "Dear Doctor" Letters
On June 23, 2011, after years of plaintiffs using Dear Doctor letters to
defeat manufacturing defendants' preemption arguments, the Supreme
Court issued its decision in Pliva v. Mensing. That decision-for now
forecloses the argument that a manufacturer of a generic drug could have
and should have sent a Dear Doctor letter to strengthen a drug's warnings;
the Supreme Court held that "federal law d[oes] not permit [generic]
Manufacturers to issue additional warnings through Dear Doctor letters." 6 1
In Mensing, plaintiff respondents sued generic drug manufacturers
alleging failure to warn of risks of developing tardive dyskinesia from
taking metoclopramide (the generic form of Reglan@). 6 2 They argued that
the generic manufacturers should have strengthened their label through
either the CBE process or through a Dear Doctor letter. 63 Specifically, they
asserted that the generic manufacturers "could have used 'Dear Doctor'
letters to send additional warnings to prescribing physicians and other
healthcare professionals."
After a review of the FDA's position and its labeling regulations, the
Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs' position. The Court ruled "[a] Dear
Doctor letter that contained substantial new warning information would not
be consistent with the drug's approved labeling."6 5 Accordingly, the Court
found that "if generic drug manufacturers, but not the brand-name
manufacturer, sent such letters, that would inaccurately imply a therapeutic
difference between the brand and generic drugs and thus could be
impermissibly 'misleading'."6 The Court "conclude[d] that federal law did
not permit the manufacturers to issue additional warnings through Dear
Doctor letters." Unfortunately, Mensing gave no guidance on when brand

FDA send a 'Dear Doctor' letter to health care professional, warning them of the risks
associated with using ibuprofen concurrently with other drugs known to be hepatotoxic); see
also, Demahy, 593 F.3d at 444-45 (5th Cir. 2010); Vitatoe, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 615-16.
60.
Pliva v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2576 (2011).
61.
Id. at 2576.
62.
Id. at 2573.
63.
Id. at 2575-76.
64.
Id. at 2576.
Id.
65.
Id.
66.
Id.
67.
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name manufacturers should issue Dear Doctor letters.
Despite Mensing's apparently clear ruling regarding generic
manufacturers' lack of any duty to send Dear Doctor letters, some lower
courts have already criticized the holding.69 Others have found that there
are still situations in which generic manufacturers are required to send Dear
Doctor letters. 70 In Fisher v. Pelstring, for example, the Superior Court of
Washington D.C. defied Mensing's holding and ruled that the generic
manufacturer should have "issue[d] a 'Dear Doctor' letter" alerting
physicians of changes made in the branded drug's label."
Similarly, in
Brasley-Thrash v. Teva Pharmaceuticals, the District Court for the
Southern District of Alabama held that the plaintiffs effort to amend her
complaint was not futile where she planned to allege that the defendant
generic drug manufacturers were liable for failing to send a Dear Doctor
letter advising her treating physician of a change in the label for a brand
name drug. 72 Thus, despite Mensing's seeming preemption protection,
generic manufacturers still have to consider whether a Dear Doctor mailer
should be sent, and if so, work with the FDA to encourage either the FDA
or the brand name manufacturer to send them out.
Also looming over Mensing's preemption holding is proposed legislation
to overtum it. Introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) in April 2012,
the bill would permit generic drug manufacturers to change their labels
independent of the brand name drug. 73 Although the legislation has not yet
passed in its current form, it is unlikely to be Congress's last word in
response to Mensing. Other alternative bills may surface, which could
68.

Id.

69.
See e.g., In re Budeprion Marketing & Sales Litig., Case Nos. 2107,09-md-2107,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91176 at *46 (E.D. Pa. July 2, 2012) ("An individual's ability to sue
for damages caused by prescription medication should not depend on whether the drug was
name brand or generic. If drug manufacturers are legally responsible for their products (like
every other maker of a good), generic drug makers should not be immune from liability. The
Supreme Court decision renders generic drug makers parrots, free from liability provided
they do a competent job copying the label of the name brand drug maker's label.")
70.
See, e.g., Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 678 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2012); Couick v. Wyeth,
Inc., Civ. A. No. 09-210, 2012 WL 79670 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 16, 2012); Brasley-Thrash v.
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., Civ. A. No. 10-31, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102858, 2012 WL
4025734 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 12, 2011); Hassett v. Dafoe, No. 1551, 1997, 2012 WL 1512551
(C.C.P. Phila. Mar. 22, 2012).
71.
Fisher v. Pelstring, 817 F. Supp. 2d 791, 834-35 (D.C.S.C. 2012).
72.
Brasley-Thrash v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 2011 WL 4025734, at 4 (S.D. Ala. Sept.
12, 2011).
73.
Patient Safety and Generic Labeling Improvement Act, S. 2295, 112th Cong.
(2012); see generally James W. Huston, Erin M. Bosman & Julie Y. Park, Client Alert: Bill
to Undo Mensing Decision and Allow Patients to Sue Generic Drug Makers for Failure to
Warn, MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP (Apr. 19, 2012), available at http://www.mofo.com/files/
Uploads/Images/120419-Mensing-Decision.pdf.
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include requiring generics to alert physicians of changes to the brand label
through Dear Doctor letters, or requiring generics to request the FDA send a
Dear Doctor mailer on their behalf if they think a label change is necessary.
B. The Dear Doctor Letter Causation Argument
In failure-to-warn cases, brought under negligence or strict liability
theories (and usually both), a key battleground is whether the plaintiff can
prove that the allegedly inadequate warnings and instructions proximately
caused the plaintiffs injuries. Under the learned intermediary rule, this
usually requires showing that had plaintiffs physicians reviewed an
adequate warning, they would not have prescribed or continued using the
drug, or would have used a different dose or enhanced monitoring
methods.
However, in our experience, in most cases, doctors do not read the drug
label (particularly the label effective at the time of plaintiffs treatment)
before administering the drug. And if the prescribing physician or other
treating physicians never read the supposedly inadequate label, how could
the manufacturer's warnings and instructions (or lack thereof) possibly have
caused plaintiffs alleged injuries? Even with causation typically being a
question of fact for the jury, there are legions of state and federal decisions
granting summary judgment on the issue of causation when there is no
evidence that a doctor has read the pertinent warning.
74.
The "learned intermediary doctrine" is substantive state law. Generally, it requires
that "only the physician who prescribes an inherently dangerous drug need be warned (and
not his patient)[.]" See Nixv. SmithKline Beecham, Corp., No. CIV06-43-PHX-SMM, 2007
WL 4219157, *2 (D. Ariz. Nov. 28, 2007); Dyer v. Best Pharmacal, 118 Ariz. 465, 468
(Ariz. App. Div. 1987) ("A drug manufacturer has discharged his duty to the public if he has
properly warned the administering physician of the contraindications and possible side
effects of the drug."). If there is no evidence that the prescribing physician would have
changed his mind absent other additional warnings, there is no proximate cause. Gebhardt v.
Mentor Corp., 191 F.R.D. 180, 184-85 (D. Ariz. 1999) (granting summary judgment for
defendant where there was no evidence that treating physician would have changed
treatment if different warnings had been given).
75.
See, e.g., Gebhardt v. Mentor Corp., 191 F.R.D. 180, 184-85 & n.1 (D. Ariz. 1999)
(granting summary judgment based on lack of causation where plaintiff's doctor did not
review package insert, but relied on other information such as "prior experience, peer
articles, and an interview" with the inventor of the medical device at issue), aff'd Gebhardt v.
Mentor Corp., 15 Fed. Appx. 540 (9th Cir. 2001); Southwest Pet Prods., Inc. v. Koch Indus.,
Inc., 273 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1062 (D. Ariz. 2003) (granting summary judgment on failure-towarn claim where plaintiff "presented absolutely no evidence that a different warning would
have changed its conduct"); Owens v. Wyeth, No. 185 EDA 2009, 2010 Pa. Super. LEXIS
2095, at *6 (Pa. Super. Ct. July 26, 2010) (dismissing failure-to-warn claim where plaintiff
failed to show alternative warning would have changed prescribing doctor's decision);
Bankerv. Hoehn, 718 N.Y.S.2d 438, 441 (N.Y.A.D 2000) ("in the absence of reviewing any
operating manuals for the [device]" by the prescriber, summary judgment granted on lack of
proximate cause).
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Enter the Dear Doctor letter causation argument: if defendant
manufacturer had just sent out a Dear Doctor letter including the
information that plaintiff says the doctor should have been warned about,
plaintiff's doctors would have surely read it, and plaintiff would never have
been injured by the drug. This argument has been rejected by some courts
as speculative and unwise, and accepted by others to allow plaintiffs
causation claim to proceed to trial.76
1. Courts Rejecting Dear Doctor Letter Argument
a. Rodriguez v. Stryker Corp., 680 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2012)
Rodriguez v. Stryker Corp. is currently the only Federal Circuit-level
case analyzing whether a plaintiff's argument that "defendants could have
sent out a Dear Doctor letter" is sufficient to present a triable issue of fact
on causation in a failure-to-wam case 77 While the Sixth Circuit firmly
rejected the Dear Doctor letter arguments made by the instant plaintiff and
affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants, it
left open avenues for other plaintiffs to make out successful Dear Doctor
letter theories.
In Rodriguez, the plaintiff sued Stryker Corporation, the manufacturer of
a pain pump, and Stryker's sales affiliate, alleging that the pump's delivery
of a local anesthetic to his shoulder joint after arthroscopic surgery caused
him to develop chondrolysis-a complete deterioration of the cartilage in
his shoulder.
The district court found that at the time of plaintiffs
surgery, defendants "could not have reasonably have known about the risk
of chondrolysis" and "thus had no duty to warn of the risk." 7 9 The district
court also held that even if defendants had a duty to warn, plaintiff "failed
as a matter of law to prove causation." 0
We focus on the causation holding, which implicates plaintiffs Dear
Doctor letter arguments. To prevail on his failure-to-wam claim, the
plaintiff had to show that had defendants given additional warnings, he
would not have sustained his injury.8 ' The only evidence he offered on this
point was the deposition testimony of his surgeon, Dr. Kuhn. 82 However,
76.
See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Stryker Corp., 680 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2012) (rejecting Dear
Doctor letter argument); Winter v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., No. 06-04049-CV-C-NKL, 2011
WL 5008008 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 20, 2011) (accepting Dear Doctor letter argument).
77.
Rodriguez, 680 F.3d at 570.
Id.
78.
Id.
79.
80. Id. at 570, 575.
81.
Id. at 575.
82. Id.
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Dr. Kuhn testified that he did not recall ever reviewing Stryker's pump
instructions or speaking with a Stryker sales representative.83 A nurse
would simply deliver the pump to Dr. Kuhn in the operating room, "without
any packaging or the instructions for use."84 Thus, plaintiff faced a
"causation problem": he had "no evidence that, even if Stryker had placed
the proposed warning in the instructions or given it through a sales
representative, the warning would have reached Dr. Kuhn or would have
prevented the injury."8.
As the Sixth Circuit put it, plaintiff tried to "sidestep" the causation
problem by "add[ing]" that defendants should have warned physicians
through a Dear Doctor letter or a label directly on the pain pump. Both of
these arguments suffered three main flaws.
First, plaintiff had not pled the Dear Doctor letter or direct label theories
in his complaint-he only claimed that defendants should have provided
"adequate" warnings.7 "If these warnings were the only 'adequate' ones in
this setting, it was Rodriguez's burden to argue that and provide evidence
showing that.""" Thus, future plaintiffs are now on notice that it would be
wise to plead the Dear Doctor letter (or any other alternative warning)
argument in their complaint, and likely present some expert testimony as to
why only that kind of warning would be "adequate." Presumably, with
respect to Dear Doctor letters, that would require some analysis of the 21
C.F.R. § 200.5 "important" information standard and FDA policies and
practices with respect to Dear Doctor letters.
Second, the Sixth Circuit in Rodriguez criticized the plaintiff for raising
the Dear Doctor letter and direct label options in connection with his "FDA
arguments"-relating to the manufacturer's duty to warn-89 rather than in
the causation context. The plaintiff argued that "Stryker should have
known that it needed to 'revise its instructions or at least circulate a Dear
Doctor Letter' when the FDA rejected its requests to approve the pump
specifically for use in a joint." 90 But, the court had already concluded that
the FDA position in response to Stryker's 510(k) requests did not indicate
in any way that using the pain pump in a joint was unsafe. 91 Thus, if
Id.
83.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 576.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Plaintiff argued that defendants should have known that the pain pump was not safe
to use in a joint because the FDA had denied permission to market the pump for that use. Id.
at 573-74.
90. Id. at 576 (citation omitted).
91.
Id.; see also id. at 573-74 (analyzing 510(k) process).
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plaintiffs plan on making a Dear Doctor letter causation argument, it needs
to be made directly.
The Sixth Circuit in Rodriguez detailed a third and final impediment to
plaintiff's Dear Doctor letter and direct label arguments: they were simply
not supported by the evidence.9 2 With respect to Dear Doctor letters,
plaintiff could only point to the following deposition testimony:

Q: A Dear Doctor letter is when a company ... leam[s] ... they are
now getting adverse reports on a particular, either machine, or the
drug, [and] they send out a letter called a Dear Doctor letter to warn
the doctors or instruct the doctors of what's happened?
A: Yes

Q: You have had that over the years, have you not?
A: I have seen that for medications, yes.
This exchange conveys only the unsurprising reality that Dr. Kuhn knew
what 'Dear Doctor' letters were, not that he received and reviewed them,
and most importantly not what he would have done with a "Dear Doctor"
letter in this case and not what such a letter would have looked like in this
instance.

Plaintiff raised no genuine issue of fact for trial that a Dear Doctor letter
would have caused Dr. Kuhn not to use the Stryker pain pump in plaintiff s

joint.94
In Rodriguez, the court implied that a claim for causation could survive a
challenge if a plaintiff did the following to support the Dear Doctor letter
causation argument: (1) obtain testimony that the treating doctor or doctors
would have received and reviewed the proposed letter (and actually
articulate what that letter would have said); and, (2) obtain testimony that
the treating doctor would have heeded the proposed letter; and therefore,
would not have used the product (or whatever other statement is necessary
to show that plaintiff s injuries would have been prevented). Obtaining this
testimony poses risks, of course, for the plaintiff. While, in our experience,
most doctors who are asked in deposition are too embarrassed to say
anything other than, "of course, I review all Dear Doctor letters that cross
my desk" (even though that's likely not always true), 95 Most plaintiffs are
afraid to draft some concrete language for the Dear Doctor letter, lest that
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 576.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc. v. Bailey, 878 So.2d 31, 42, 58 (Miss. 2004).
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box them in at trial. And, we have seen no plaintiffs dare to ask if the
doctor would have done anything differently had he or she reviewed a
specific Dear Doctor letter. After all, the answer could very well be, "no, I
would have prescribed the same medicine all over again"-and out goes the
plaintiff's Dear Doctor letter argument, and the chance to survive summary
judgment. Instead, plaintiffs counsel will usually ask the more benign
question: "Doctor, if you had received a Dear Doctor letter, would you have
followed what it said?" Without any context for what the Dear Doctor
letter would instruct, most doctors of course say yes-why would they not
follow an FDA-approved letter with important drug information?
However, it is not only plaintiffs that shy away from asking the pointed
question of whether a particular Dear Doctor letter would have made a
difference. Defense counsel fears asking that question, too, as there is a
chance that the doctor, accustomed to following instructions in Dear Doctor
letters, will say "yes, I would have done things differently." It is far safer
for the defense to argue on summary judgment that there is "no evidence"
that a Dear Doctor letter would have avoided plaintiff s injury.
b. Kapps v. Biosense Webster, Inc., 813 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Minn. 2011)
Kapps v. Biosense Webster, Inc. is a district court case that, like
Rodriguez, rejected the Dear Doctor letter causation argument because
plaintiff could not show that his doctors would have done anything
differently if defendant had sent out a Dear Doctor letter. 9 6 Kapps provides
an interesting twist, because the plaintiff actually braved crafting the
content of the proposed Dear Doctor letter and was criticized soundly for
it. 9 7 Like Rodriguez, Kapps does not close the door to other plaintiffs
making out successful Dear Doctor letter arguments on a different set of
facts, but it does provide ample ammunition for defendants seeking to
defeat Dear Doctor letter causation arguments.
In Kapps, plaintiff sought to recover for injuries he suffered when the tip
of a catheter-made by defendant Biosense Webster ("Biosense")snapped off and became entangled in the mitral valve of his heart. 98
Plaintiff suffered pericardial bleeding and damage to his mitral valve, which
required treatment with open-heart surgery. 99 The catheter at issue was sold
by Biosense to the Mayo Clinic and used in a patient other than plaintiff.
Then, contrary to Biosense's instructions to use the catheter only once, the
Mayo Clinic sent the used catheter to defendant Ascent Healthcare
96.
97.
98.
99.

Kapps v. Biosense Webster, Inc., 813 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1156 (D. Minn. 2011).
Id.
Id. at 1133.
Id.
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Solutions ("Ascent") for reprocessing, so that it could be used in another
patient (ultimately, plaintiff).Ioo

We focus on the district court's grant of full summary judgment to
Biosense (Ascent was left in the case), and in particular on the analysis of
plaintiff's failure-to-wam claim. Plaintiff argued that Biosense's catheter
was defective because: (1) it lacked adequate warnings about the risk of
mitral-valve entrapment, and (2) it lacked adequate instructions about how
to extricate an entrapped catheter.' 0 ' Plaintiffs warning-defect claim was
not based on Biosense's instructions for use-plaintiff's expert admitted,
"doctors don't read [instructions for use] in great detail every time."102
Rather, plaintiffs expert opined that Biosense should have warned about
mitral-valve entrapment in a Dear Doctor letter, which would say, "Dear
Doctor, we have had a few reports of entrapment of this catheter in the
mitral valve. Please be very careful with its use in the atrium, et cetera, et
cetera."1 03
The district court gave a free pass to plaintiff on the issue of whether he
could show that Biosense should have issued a Dear Doctor letter, as
opposed to inserting the proposed warning in the catheter's instructions for
use. 04 Plaintiffs warning expert testified that there are "probably some"
Dear Doctor letter regulatory requirements, but didn't "know them" and
couldn't "quote them."'
(As shocking as this may seem, many warningdefect experts are unfamiliar, not only with Dear Doctor letter regulations,
but FDA labeling regulations more generally-a fruitful subject for a
Daubert motion' 06 to exclude a plaintiffs warning-defect expert.) Because
neither party briefed Dear Doctor Regulations, the district court did not
make a ruling on the subject.
The District Court of Minnesota assumed, "for the sake of argument"
that Biosense could have issued the warning advocated by the plaintiff' 07
Had Biosense analyzed the "important" information standard and categories

100. Id. at 1134.
101.
Id. at 1155. Plaintiff also argued that Biosense failed to warn of the dangers
associated with reprocessing. Id. However, the court easily dismissed this argument, in light
of Biosense's clear instruction to use the catheter only once. The court found it "fanciful" to
suggest that Biosense has a further duty to tell doctors, in effect, "Our catheters are labeled
for a single use. We really mean it. Some companies will offer to reprocess our catheters.
Those companies will tell you that the reprocessed catheters are safe. Don't believe them."
Id. at 1158-59.
102. Id. at 1155 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
103.
Id.
104. Id. at 1156.
105. Id.
106. Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
107. Id.
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in 21 C.F.R. § 200.5, it could have made strong arguments, especially
through an expert, that a proposed warning to be "very careful" does not
meet the requirements of a Dear Doctor letter. The lesson here is that
plaintiffs and defendants are both well-advised to have warning-defect
experts who are savvy about Dear Doctor letter and other FDA regulatory
requirements. If only one side or the other has such a knowledgeable
expert, that imbalance can tip the scale for the court's analysis of whether a
Dear Doctor letter was feasible in the instant case.
The court also assumed, "for the sake of argument," that plaintiffs
doctors would have paid closer attention to a Dear Doctor letter than to
instructions included with the catheter. 0 Nevertheless, the Kapps court
dismissed plaintiffs failure-to-warn claim because he could not show that
his doctors "would have done anything differently" if Biosense had sent out
the proposed Dear Doctor letter.109
The District Court of Minnesota first critiqued plaintiffs proposed
"[p]lease be very careful" warning as "content-free.""10 The court noted
that plaintiffs expert testified that an instruction for extricating the
entrapped catheter "might" be: "if you get this thing entangled and it
doesn't disentangle with a little clockwise torque, you would call a
surgeon."" But this did not help plaintiffs warning claim, as his expert
said he was not going to render an opinion on what disentanglement
instruction "should have been included."112 The court in Kapps further
assessed that plaintiffs "content-free" Dear Doctor "would not have
changed anyone 's behavior."" 3 After all, "[s]urely doctors know, based on
their training and common sense, that they must be 'very careful' when
manipulating an instrument inside a human heart." 4 The court in Kapps
thus cautions future plaintiffs to put specific content in their proposed Dear
Doctor letter that, at least on its face, sounds like it could make a difference
in the product's use. The court in Kapps also encourages defendants to pin
down plaintiffs on their proposed Dear Doctor letter content, so they can
deconstruct and decimate it.
The court in Kapps then analyzed another glaring flaw in plaintiffs Dear
Doctor letter argument: no one had deposed Dr. Wong, the doctor
manipulating the catheter when it became entrapped." 5 Thus, as to Dr.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
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Wong, there was "not a shred of evidence in the record that" a Dear Doctor
letter warning would have changed anything about how the heart procedure
was done. 6
The court rejected the argument that the heeding
presumption-i.e., the presumption that if a product comes with a warning,
it will be read-could establish the effect of the Dear Doctor letter on Dr.
Wong." 7 Minnesota, providing the applicable state law, had not adopted
the heeding presumption."" Even if it had, the presumption would not have
helped Kapps: "What is presumed under the heeding presumption is that the
omitted warning would have been heeded, not that the heeding of the
omitted warning would have prevented the plaintiffs injury.""l 9 In the
instant case, however, there was no evidence that if Dr. Wong "had heeded
the warning to be very careful, he would have done something differently,"
and thus there was "no evidence that the absence of that warning caused
Kapps's injuries." 20
We find it odd that neither plaintiff nor defendant chose to depose Dr.
Wong; typically, it is in both parties' best interests to depose all of the
treating physicians to develop their case theories and defenses. While the
court in Kapps suggests that in some cases there is a tactical advantage in
favor of the defense to not depose a treating doctor, we would not
recommend this as a general rule to either plaintiffs or defendants. For
plaintiffs, this could be the issue keeping them from surviving summary
judgment. Even in states with heeding presumptions, the presumptions may
not be sufficient to create a triable issue of fact regarding whether the
doctor would have done something differently based on the Dear Doctor
letter. As for defendants, they are ill advised to forego deposing a treating
doctor and thus have no indication of what that doctor will say at trialincluding, theoretically, that plaintiff s proposed warning would have made
all the difference.
Finally, the court noted in Kapps that the deposition testimony of Dr.
Packer, who supervised Dr. Wong and was in charge of extricating the
catheter once it was entrapped, provided even further support that the
proposed Dear Doctor letter would not have prevented plaintiff s injuries.' 2 '
Dr. Packer testified that he "has not changed anything about how he uses"
the catheter at issue despite what happened during plaintiffs procedure.12 2
In fact, plaintiff's procedure gave Dr. Packer "direct personal knowledge of
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id. at 1157 n.22.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1158.
Id.
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the very information" that allegedly should have been in the Dear Doctor
letter.123 The court reasoned that if that knowledge did not change
Dr. Packer's conduct after the procedure, receiving the proposed Dear
Doctor letter (conveying that same knowledge) before the procedure would
not have changed his conduct during the procedure. 12 4 The court then
concluded that "a reasonable jury could not find a causal connection"
between the alleged warning defect and plaintiff s injuries.125 This holding
suggests that plaintiff s counsel should try to elicit treating doctor testimony
that his or her practice has changed after what happened to plaintiff, while
defendants should try elicit testimony that the treating doctor continued to
do all the things the same way, despite plaintiff s injuries.
c. Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., Inc., 731 F. Supp. 2d 135 (D.N.H. 2010)126
Bartlett is a pre-Mensing case where the District Court of New
Hampshire granted summary judgment on plaintiffs failure-to-warn claim,
though not on all claims, after finding no evidence that plaintiffs treating
doctor read the generic drug's package insert.12 7 While the court in Bartlett
could have dismissed plaintiffs failure-to-wam claim more summarily
post-Mensing (because it involved a generic drug manufacturer), the case
nonetheless provides noteworthy analysis and rejection of plaintiffs
"speculative" Dear Doctor letter causation arguments,128 which are arguably
still good law.
In Bartlett, the plaintiff sued generic drug manufacturer Mutual
Pharmaceuticals ("Mutual") after experiencing severe side effects from the
drug sulindac-a non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug ("NSAID").12 9
Within weeks of taking the drug, the plaintiff was diagnosed with StevensJohnson Syndrome ("SJS"), progressing to toxic epidermal necrolysis
("TEN")-a potentially fatal condition involving necrosis, or death, of the
skin and mucous membranes.130 The plaintiff suffered from a two-month
coma and permanent injuries, including blindness.131 The sulindac label
expressly listed SJS/TEN as a potential adverse reaction in the "Adverse
Reactions" section, and warned about "severe skin reactions" that could
Id.
123.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126.
A petition for writ of certiorari in the Bartlett case was filed by Mutual
Pharmaceutical Company, Inc., on July 31, 2012 (Docket No. 12-142).
127.
See Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., Inc., 731 F.Supp.2d 135, 141 (D.N.H. 2010).
128. Id. at 149.
129. Id. at 142.
130. Id.
Id.
131.
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lead to fatalities, without mentioning SJS/TEN by name in the "Warnings"
section. 132
Dr. Ergin, who prescribed Clinoril (the brand name version of sulindac)
for the plaintiff, admitted that he never reviewed the sulindac label before
treating plaintiff and that "nothing about it influenced [his] prescribing of
the drug or what he told Bartlett about it." 33 Dr. Ergin further testified that
"without reading the warning label [he] knew from his medical background
that Sulindac and other NSAIDs carried some risk of causing SJS/TEN." 3 4
Nonetheless, he claimed that if there had been "strong warnings in place
about what may well be a higher risk of severe reactions like SJS and TEN
with [s]ulindac ... he likely would have prescribed a different drug for
Bartlett that carried less risk of SJS/TEN." 35 Dr. Ergin admitted that he
still prescribes sulindac "on rare occasions, even after learning of Bartlett's
ordeal." 36
Mutual argued that causation was lacking because Dr. Ergin never
reviewed the label.13 7 The court agreed, holding that "even assuming
arguendo that Mutual had a duty to strengthen the SJS/TEN warning on its
[s]ulindac label, that stronger warning would not have affected Dr. Ergin's
decision or prevented Bartlett's injuries" because he did not read the
label.138 Even if the heeding presumption applied under the applicable state
law (New Hampshire), Dr. Ergin's testimony rebutted that presumption by
making clear he did not review the label; and thus, would not have heeded
any changes to it.139
Enter again the Dear Doctor letter causation argument, which in Bartlett
was raised by the court sua sponte, among other non-label arguments,
during the summary judgment oral argument.140 Plaintiff "seized the
opportunity" and argued that Dr. Ergin would have heeded a stronger
warning sent out in a Dear Doctor letter.' 4
The court rejected the

132. Id. at 142-43.
133.
Bartlett, 731 F.Supp.2d at 143 (internal quotations and citation omitted) (Dr. Ergin
also did not review the Clinoril label "in detail" before treating plaintiff.).
134. Id.
135. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 146.
138.
Id. (Plaintiff also argued that Dr. Ergin's review of the identical label for the
brand-name drug, Clinoril, could establish causation. Id. However, the court found that Dr.
Ergin's "cursory review" of that label, which did not include review of the SJS/TEN
warning, showed that even if the warnings had been stronger, "they would not have reached
Dr. Ergin's attention.").
139. Bartlett, 731 F.Supp.2d at 147.
140. Id. at 148.
Id.
141.
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argument, finding "no evidence about whether Dr. Ergin has a practice of
reading such letters" and "little, if any, evidence about the process for
distributing such letters." 4 2 Accordingly, the court found "any causation
theory based on a 'Dear Doctor' letter ... purely speculative." 43 Of
course, the finding in Bartlett that the Dear Doctor letter is "purely
speculative" is easily distinguishable from cases with testimony from the
treating doctor that he or she routinely reviewed and relied upon Dear
Doctor letters, and that the proposed Dear Doctor letter in the instant case
would have changed the plaintiff s treatment.
What is not-so-distinguishable is the finding in Bartlett that Dear Doctor
letter arguments (and other non-label theories)
[r]est upon a dubious proposition: that even if [defendant] had
strengthened the [subject] warning on its [drug] label . . . that still would

have been a legally inadequate warning unless [defendant] took additional
steps beyond the label to disseminate such information. [Plaintiff] has not
identified any authority or evidence for that proposition.14 4
In other words, like in Rodriguez, plaintiff should have the burden of
showing that a change to the label would not have been an "adequate"
warning, and that only a Dear Doctor letter would have provided an
"adequate" one.
2. Cases (Indirectly) Supporting the
Dear Doctor Letter Causation Argument
As with many areas in products liability, there are cases that oppose
Rodriguez, Kapps, and Bartlett's rejection of Dear Doctor letter causation
arguments. We suspect that as the case law develops, there will be more
cases giving credence to the Dear Doctor letter causation argumentparticularly as plaintiffs succeed in establishing stronger evidentiary bases
for the argument.
a. Winter v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., No. 06-04049-CV-C-NKL, 2011
WL 5008008 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 20, 2011).
Winter v. Novartis is a paradigm case where the plaintiffs doctor did not
review the subject drug's package insert, the defendant moved for summary
judgment on lack of causation for the failure-to-wam claim, and
nevertheless, the district court allowed the plaintiff to proceed to trial.14 6
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
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While the court's reasoning is cursory (apparently because an MDL
transferee court had already denied a similar summary judgment motion and
the court was "hesitant to disturb the MDL court's ruling"), it provides
some support to plaintiffs seeking to validate Dear Doctor-or other nonlabel-based-causation arguments on a scarce evidentiary record. 47
In Winter, Ruth Baldwin148 was prescribed cancer drugs Aredia and
Zometa after being diagnosed with breast cancer with metastases to her
spine and liver.149 The prescribing oncologist testified that he could not
recall a patient with metastases to whom he did not prescribe one of these
drugs prior to when he stopped using them on Ms. Baldwin.5 0 Beginning
in September 2003, Novartis made a series of changes in its package insert
to alert physicians to the potential side effect of osteonecrosis of the jaw
(ONJ)' -a serious bone disease that exposes the jaw bones through
lesions in the gums. Novartis also "highlighted" the latest label changes
regarding ONJ in a September 24, 2004 Dear Doctor letter.12
There was no dispute that plaintiffs oncologist "never read the package
inserts for Aredia and Zometa," apparently because he believed "Novartis
produced them in a way that made them useless to a practitioner."' 53 The
parties disputed whether the oncologist received the September 24, 2004
Dear Doctor letter. ' 4
The parties did not dispute, however, that
Ms. Baldwin's dentist (who had not prescribed the subject drugs) had
received no warnings about the risks of ONJ in patients on Aredia and
Zometa, including the warning that tooth extractions-like those done on
plaintiff on November 6, 2003 and September 9, 2004 (twenty days before
the date of the Dear Doctor letter)-may exacerbate ONJ.'
Novartis argued that the fact that Ms. Baldwin's oncologist testified that
he did not read the relevant package inserts-i.e. "made himself ignorant"
of their content-precluded a finding of causation on her failure-to-warn
claim. 5 6 The district court disagreed on two grounds.
First, the court found a triable issue of fact in the oncologist's
-even
unsupported allegation that the package insert was "useless"
5008008
147.
148.
149.
150.

(W.D. Mo. Oct. 20, 2011).
Id. at *2.
Plaintiff Christine Winter was suing on behalf of Ms. Baldwin's estate. Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.

151.

Id.

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *1-*3.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
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though it was approved in form and content by the FDA. Indeed, some of
the ONJ warnings were made at the FDA's own request.
Second, setting an exceedingly low evidentiary bar for non-label
arguments akin to Dear Doctor letter arguments, the court gave weight to
plaintiff's argument that "Novartis had a duty to reflect the known side
effects of its medication in articles and communications through sales
representatives, both of which could have reached [the oncologist] and
changed the course of events despite his not reading package inserts."1 5 9
The district court required no evidence to support that the oncologist "would
have" received a non-label warning or that this hypothetical warning
"would have" changed whether Ms. Baldwin was prescribed these drugs
and whether she would have had her tooth extractions. Had there not been
a Dear Doctor letter sent by Novartis, this court likely would have accepted
that a theoretical Dear Doctor letter "could have changed the course of
events" without any evidence that the oncologist made it a practice to
review these letters, or that such a letter would have made any difference in
his treatment decisions.
Putting aside its lenient causation standard on summary judgment, the
court in Winter provided a few useful lessons on Dear Doctor letters for
pharmaceutical manufacturers, such as a lesson on hard-copy versus
electronic mailers. The parties in Winter disputed whether the oncologist
had received the Dear Doctor letter.160 Proving the receipt of hard copy
Dear Doctor letters by a specific doctor may be difficult or impossible,
especially if the doctor's recollection is hazy.
Thus, even if a
pharmaceutical manufacturer sends out a snail-mail mailer-following 21
C.F.R. 200.5 by providing a detailed warning of the precise risk at issue at
just the right time so as to be able to avoid a plaintiffs injuries-that still
may not be enough to prove that the warning was provided. Accordingly,
manufacturers should consider e-mailing Dear Doctor letters, with
electronic tracking to provide a definite answer as to who received the
information and when.
Another lesson highlighted in Winter is the importance of carefully
thinking through to whom Dear Doctor letters should be sent. Given that
the Dear Doctor letter at issue dealt specifically with ONJ in relation to
dental surgery, it likely should have been sent out to dentists and oral
surgeons. Because there was no dispute that these categories of health care
providers were not included in the recipient list, the district court left the
decision of whether Novartis had a duty to wam plaintiffs dentist about

158.
159.
160.
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Zometa and Aredia to the jury. 16 Based on FDA guidance issued after
Ms. Baldwin suffered her injuries, the answer is almost certainly yes.162
Indeed, in April 2012 a jury awarded Ms. Baldwin $225,000 in
compensatory damages for her injuries.
b.

Tucker v. SmithKline Beecham, Corp.,
701 F.Supp. 2d 1040 (S.D. Ind. 2010)

Tucker, like Winter, does not provide direct support for the Dear Doctor
letter causation argument, but provides some helpful language for plaintiffs
trying to use that argument to avoid summary judgment. Tucker also raises
additional considerations that drug manufacturers should keep in mind
before issuing Dear Doctor letters. These considerations will be discussed
at the end of this section.
Tucker is distinguishable from Winter from the get go. In Tucker, the
treating doctor actually read the package insert for the drug at issue, but
complained it did not wam clearly enough about the attendant risk of
suicide.1 63 The causation argument balanced on whether an additional
"adequate" warning-be it in the label or through other means (such as a
Dear Doctor letter)-would have changed the doctor's treatment decisions.
Tucker concerned the warnings associated with the drug Paxil, an
antidepressant classified as a selective serotonin re-uptake inhibitor or
"SSRI." 6 4 In 2002, the year Father Tucker (yes, the plaintiff was a priest)
was prescribed Paxil, the label warned that the "possibility of a suicide
attempt is inherent in major depressive disorder and may persist until
significant remission occurs."6 5 Father Tucker committed suicide a few
weeks after he began taking Paxil. 6 6
Before prescribing Paxil to Father Tucker, Dr. Bright reviewed the
package insert. 6 7 He did not recall any "specific warnings in 2002
regarding an association between Paxil and suicide in adults," nor did he
161
have any "independent knowledge" of such an association at that time.
Dr. Bright testified that "[i]f he had been provided with a warning that Paxil
was associated with suicide, he would have considered that warning in

161.
162.
163.
2010).
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at *3.
See supra Section II(A)(4).
Tucker v. Smithkline Beecham, Corp., 701 F.Supp. 2d 1040, 1067 (S.D. Ind.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
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making his decision to prescribe Paxil to Father Tucker."1 6 9 Notably, in
2006, SmithKline issued a Dear Doctor letter advising of such an
association: a "statistically significant" increase in suicidal behavior in
adults with major depressive disorder who were on Paxil (as opposed to a
placebo) .170

SmithKline moved for summary judgment based on lack of causation
because Dr. Bright knew that patients on Paxil were at risk for suicide
before prescribing it to Father Tucker.17' The court found there was triable
issue of fact on causation based on Dr. Bright's comment that he "would
have considered" information in a more "explicit warning."172 The court
was not bothered that there was no evidence that an additional suicide
warning-whether via a revised package insert or a Dear Doctor letter (the
court didn't specify)-would have changed his decision to prescribe
Paxil.173 Because "Dr. Bright's statement [was] not definitive either way,"
the court reasoned, "it must be construed in favor of the plaintiff"' 74 Thus,
like Winter, Tucker provides a very loose standard to survive a causation
summary judgment motion in a failure-to-warn case.
Tucker provides additional considerations for drug manufacturers to keep
in mind before issuing Dear Doctor letters, as such letters very well may be
used against manufacturers. 75 The court used the 2006 Dear Doctor letter
in rejecting SmithKline's Daubert motions to exclude plaintiffs experts. 76
Not surprisingly, the court found admissible the plaintiffs expert's
controversial opinion that there was an increased risk of suicidality in adult
patients taking Paxil, when SmithKline's Dear Doctor letter essentially
stated as much. '7
Similarly, the court found that another plaintiffs
expert's opinion regarding general causation was reliable, as it
"appropriately relied on [SmithKline's] voluntary issuance of a 'Dear
Doctor' letter." 7"
Thus, manufacturers should be certain they are
comfortable with each word of a Dear Doctor letter, as plaintiffs counsel
may readily use each word as a defense concession or admission.
Plaintiff also used SmithKline's 2006 Dear Doctor letter to oppose the

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 1045.
Id. at 1046.
Id. at 1067.
Id. at 1068.
Id. at 1068 ("He did not opine as to what his ultimate decision would have been.").
Id.
175.
See also Section III(C) regarding whether Dear Doctor letters may be excluded
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 407 as subsequent remedial measures.
176. Tucker, 701 F. Supp. 2d at 1061-63.
177. Id. at 1062.
178. Id. at 1063.
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argument that the 2002 Paxil label was adequate as a matter of law.17 9
While the court in Tucker held that a reasonable jury could find the 2002
label inadequate "[e]ven without comparing Paxil's 2002 label with
[SmithKline's] revisions," it is difficult to imagine that the court did not
consider such a comparison, or that the jury would not consider it either, if
presented with the juxtaposition. This leads into the discussion of whether
post-injury Dear Doctor letters constitute subsequent remedial measures
and are therefore inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 407.
C. Dear Doctor Letters as Post-Remedial Measures: Courts Divided
The Dear Doctor letter causation argument shows how not sending a
Dear Doctor letter may subject a manufacturer to a failure-to-warn claim.
When a Dear Doctor letter has been sent out after a plaintiff s alleged injury
from the drug or medical device at issue, a plaintiff may want to offer it as
evidence of the package insert's inadequacy or the manufacturer's
negligence, as we saw in Tucker.
The question then becomes, can a manufacturer exclude an issued Dear
Doctor letter from evidence at trial? It all depends on the jurisdiction.
Some courts have held that post-event label changes constitute subsequent
remedial measures and are thus inadmissible under Federal Rule of
Evidence 407.1so For example, in Chlopek v. Federal Insurance Co.,' the
Seventh Circuit held that the defendant's "motive for making the [label]
change is irrelevant. All the rule requires is that the measure 'would have
made the injury or harm less likely to occur.""18 2 Several other courts have
agreed, at least with respect to "true" label changes (these decisions do not
necessarily discuss Dear Doctor letters specifically). 8 3
At least one recent decision has come out the other way, however,
finding that Rule 407 does not apply. In 2011, Schedin v. Ortho-McNeilNanssen Pharmaceuticals,1s4 the District Court of Minnesota held, over the
manufacturer's Rule 407 objection, that evidence of labeling and label
changes (including Dear Doctor letters) that occurred after the plaintiff
ingested the drug at issue-Levaquin-were admissible.8 The court held

179.

Id. at 1067.

180. Fed. R. Evid. 407.
181.
Chlopek v. Fed. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 692, 700 (7th Cir. 2007).
182. Id.
183.
Janssen Pharm., Inc. v. Armond, 866 So. 2d 1092, 1100-01 (Miss. 2004); Stahl v.
Novartis Pharm. Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 270 n.10 (5th Cir. 2002); Martinkovic v. Bangash, No.
84 C 9568, 1987 WL 28400, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 1987); DeLuryea v. Winthrop
Laboratories, 697 F.2d 222, 227-29 (8th Cir. 1983).
184.
808 F. Supp.2d 1125 (D. Minn. 2011).
185. Id. at 1137-38.
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that because the FDA mandates label changes, the evidence fell within the
"superior governmental authority" exception to Rule 407.16
Even more recently, in Tietz v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., et al., a Dear
Doctor letter not only wound up in front of an Illinois state court jury, but
also became "Exhibit A" in the plaintiff s failure to warn case.
Plaintiff
Tietz accused Abbott Laboratories, Inc. and AbbVie, Inc. (together,
"Abbott") of failing to adequately warn doctors about the risks of
developing unrecognized histoplasmosis when taking the arthritis drug,
Humira.iss Tietz alleged that, as a result of taking Humira, his wife was
hospitalized and nearly died from a widespread histoplasmosis infection
that doctors struggled to diagnose in early May 2010. If Abbott had
adequately warned of the risk of developing a histoplasmosis infection
through a quickly distributed Dear Doctor letter, argued Tietz, doctors
could have diagnosed his wife's condition sooner.
Abbott sent a Dear Doctor letter warning of this exact risk on May 17,
2010 (this letter ultimately ended up in front of the jury).' 89 The letter
provided that "Abbott would like to inform you . .. [of] the risk of
developing unrecognized histoplasmosis."l 90 Tietz argued that Abbott
knew of the risk at least 20 months earlier (as evidenced by a FDAmandated Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy ("REMS") concerning
Humira).191 According to Abbott, however, it could not be liable for failure
to send the Dear Doctor letter sooner because it met all FDA-imposed
deadlines concerning the REMS for Humira, including timely providing a
Dear Doctor letter to the FDA for its approval.1 92
Abbot's Senior Director of Regulatory Affairs, Raymond Votzmeyer,
testified that Abbott could not have sent out the Dear Doctor letter before it
did because the letter needed FDA approval, which it did not have until

186.
The "superior governmental authority" exception to Rule 407 provides that when
remedial measures are mandated by a governmental agency, they are not voluntary and Rule
407 is accordingly inapplicable. In re Levaquin Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 08-1943, 08-5743,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124647 (D. Minn. Nov. 24, 2010).
187. Tietz v. Abbott Labs., Inc., No 12-L-002715 (jury verdict May 9, 2013).
188.
Id.; see also James W. Huston, Ellen N. Adler & Joanna L. Simon, Client Alert:
Jury Buys Plaintiff's Argument That Drug Manufacturer Should Have Distributed Dear
Doctor Letter Soon, Without Prior FDA Approval, MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP (May 15,

2013), available at http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Iages/130515-Dear-DoctorLetters.pdf [hereinafter Client Alert].
189.
Robert Hoff, M.D., Senior Medical Director, Abbott Laboratories, to Healthcare
Providers (May 17, 2010), available at http://www.humirajustice.com/pdf/fda/11-Doctor
Letter PDF.pdf.
190. Id.
191.
See supra note 188, Client Alert.
192. Id.
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April 2010.19'
Votzmeyer admitted, however, that providing full
information concerning Humira's risks was ultimately Abbott's
responsibility-not the FDA's.194
In closing, Tietz argued that Abbott's delay in sending the Dear Doctor
letter was unreasonable and contributed to his wife's injuries. He asked for
$5.8 million in damages; the jury returned a verdict in his favor for $2.2
million. 95
That Tietz was able to argue that Abbott should have sent the Dear
Doctor letter sooner despite FDA-imposed guidelines serves as a reminder
that not all courts view Dear Doctor letters as inadmissible subsequent
remedial measures.196 Additionally, it indicates that manufacturers are not
permitted to sit on information that may affect physician prescribing
decisions, and that compliance with FDA-imposed deadlines is not
sufficient to avoid liability, even when such compliance is arguably the
industry standard.1 97
Despite Schedin and Tietz, manufacturers should continue to try to
exclude post-event Dear Doctor letters and label changes in limine under
Rule 407 or the parallel state rule of evidence. Not all jurisdictions
recognize the superior governmental authority exception. Moreover, even
in those jurisdictions that do, there are strong policy arguments to be made
that Rule 407 encourages cooperation with government agencies, such as
the FDA. By admitting evidence of post-event Dear Doctor letters and
label changes, the courts are discouraging manufacturers from being
proactive and working with the FDA to make drugs safer by providing
physicians with additional warnings and information.
Nonetheless,
manufacturers should take care in crafting and sending Dear Doctor letters
because they may very well be seen-and relied upon-by a jury in the
future.
IV. CONCLUSION
The decision whether to send a Dear Doctor letter is multifaceted.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers and their counsel must consider the form,
Id.
193.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196.
The Illinois law on subsequent remedial measures is not clear. The authors of the
Illinois Rules of Evidence "reserved" on the issue of whether to adopt the federal Rule 407
standard due to a conflict among the Illinois courts of appeal.
197.
Compliance with an industry standard, although evidence of non-negligence, is not
alone sufficient to avoid liability. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932) ("Courts
must in the end say what is required; there are precautions so imperative that even their
universal disregard will not excuse their omission.").
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content, timing, and distribution list for such a letter in order to ensure
compliance with 21 C.F.R. § 200.5. Manufacturers should also seek the
approval of the FDA before distributing a Dear Doctor letter. Because Dear
Doctor letters constitute drug labeling, seeking prior FDA approval may
prevent a host of problems for manufacturers down the line, including
having to recall the letter and re-label the drug, and/or potential monetary
penalties.
Manufacturers-especially branded manufacturers-should also consider
the litigation impact of sending (or not sending) a Dear Doctor letter. Both
options can lead to a host of litigation issues. Failure to send a Dear Doctor
letter to alert the appropriate healthcare professionals can factor into failureto-warn claims and may create stumbling blocks for summary judgment,
especially when a healthcare professional testifies that he would have read a
Dear Doctor letter if sent. On the other hand, distribution of a Dear Doctor
letter may lead to additional claims that a manufacturer knew its drug label
was inadequate as evidenced by the later-sent Dear Doctor letter. Whether
these later-sent Dear Doctor letters are "subsequent remedial measures" is
jurisdiction dependent. Accordingly, manufacturers should be aware of the
possibility that a jury deciding the adequacy of a drug's previous warning
label might someday view Dear Doctor letters.
Along these same lines, manufacturers should implement standard
operating procedures with regards to drafting and sending Dear Doctor
letters. Part of that standard protocol should be including outside counsel as
the lead for the discussion. Otherwise, e-mail and other memorandum
discussing a possible Dear Doctor letter might be admitted into evidence as
an admission by a party opponent, or to show notice, even if a Dear Doctor
letter was not ultimately issued.
Despite the uncertainties that surround Dear Doctor letters, one thing is
clear: their use-both by manufacturers as a tool to convey drug
information and by lawyers as a tool in litigation-is only increasing. This
will require vigilance on the part of all players in the pharmaceutical
industry to keep up-to-date on the actions of Congress, the FDA, and the
courts concerning Dear Doctor letters.
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